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Harden sign-in and password reset

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- OTP attempt limits, constant-time compare, random reference codes
- DB-backed rate limits (429) on sign-in, OTP, reset, register, onboarding
- one generic sign-in failure message; reset request no longer reveals accounts
- no password kept in the session; real status codes on failures
This commit is contained in:
Thanakorn
2026-09-24 14:53:40 +07:00
parent ae98dcdcdd
commit 73c680e844
16 changed files with 538 additions and 282 deletions
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app/assets/utils/classes/PasswordResetManager.php
+87 -23
View File
@@ -14,20 +14,25 @@
*
* The OTP is a 6-digit TOTP derived from the user's current password hash via HMAC-SHA1,
* scoped to a 3-minute time step. It cannot be replayed after the window expires.
* A human-readable reference number (6 uppercase letters) is also generated and emailed
* so the user can confirm they received the correct OTP request.
* A random reference number (6 uppercase letters) is also generated and emailed so the
* user can confirm they received the correct OTP request. It is not derived from the
* OTP: a derived reference let anyone who saw it recover the OTP offline.
*
* HTTP handler methods for thin AJAX endpoint wrappers:
* handleRequestOtp($user_id, $company_id)
* handleRequestOtp($user_id, $company_id) — signed-in profile page
* handleRequestOtpPublic($user_id, $company_id) — login page; same answer whether
* or not the account exists
* handleConfirmReset($user_id, $data)
*
* Session keys used (prefixed with 'reset_' to avoid collision with login OTP):
* reset_otp, reset_otp_time, reset_reference, reset_user_id
* reset_otp, reset_otp_time, reset_reference, reset_user_id, reset_attempts
*
* Security:
* - OTP is HMAC-derived from the current password hash — it changes when the password changes.
* - OTP is valid for OTP_EXPIRY_MINUTES (5) only; older OTPs are rejected with clearSession().
* - reset_user_id in session is verified against $user_id to prevent cross-user OTP reuse.
* - At most OTP_MAX_ATTEMPTS wrong entries per issued OTP, then it is discarded.
* - OTPs are compared with hash_equals().
* - Session is fully destroyed on successful reset, forcing re-authentication.
* - All DB queries use PDO prepared statements with bound parameters.
* - AJAX handler methods output JSON via json_encode (XSS-safe).
@@ -43,6 +48,12 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
/** OTP validity window in minutes — matches the login OTP window. */
const OTP_EXPIRY_MINUTES = 5;
/** Wrong OTP entries allowed per issued OTP before it is discarded. */
const OTP_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5;
/** Answer shown on the login page whether or not the account exists. */
const PUBLIC_REQUEST_MESSAGE = "If an account matches, we've sent an OTP to its email.";
/**
* @param PDO $pdo1 PDO connection to the wms database (user table).
* @param PDO $pdo2 PDO connection to the company database (smtp_setting table).
@@ -94,10 +105,10 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
throw new \RuntimeException('No email address found for this account.');
}
// Generate 6-digit TOTP and a human-readable 6-letter reference number
// Generate 6-digit TOTP and a random 6-letter reference number
$otp_time = time();
$otp = $this->generateOTP($user['password'], $otp_time);
$reference_number = $this->numberToLetters((int) $this->generateOTP($otp, $otp_time));
$reference_number = $this->randomReference();
// Send via the mailer module (uses company SMTP or falls back to system default)
require_once $this->include_url . '/assets/utils/module/mailer.php';
@@ -124,6 +135,7 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
$_SESSION['reset_otp_time'] = $otp_time;
$_SESSION['reset_reference'] = $reference_number;
$_SESSION['reset_user_id'] = $user_id;
$_SESSION['reset_attempts'] = 0;
return [
'masked_email' => $this->maskEmail($user['email']),
@@ -131,6 +143,24 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
];
}
/**
* Start a reset that can never succeed, for a login-page request whose
* username/email matches no account. The session then looks exactly like a
* real request (random unguessable OTP, reset_user_id 0), so the confirm step
* answers "Incorrect OTP" instead of revealing that the account is missing.
*
* @return string Random 6-letter reference, same shape as a real one.
*/
public function startDecoy(): string {
$reference = $this->randomReference();
$_SESSION['reset_otp'] = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));
$_SESSION['reset_otp_time'] = time();
$_SESSION['reset_reference'] = $reference;
$_SESSION['reset_user_id'] = 0;
$_SESSION['reset_attempts'] = 0;
return $reference;
}
/**
* Verify the OTP and force-set a new password via PasswordManager.
*
@@ -170,8 +200,14 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
throw new \InvalidArgumentException('OTP has expired. Please request a new one.');
}
// Verify OTP value
if (trim($otp_input) !== $_SESSION['reset_otp']) {
// Verify OTP value — at most OTP_MAX_ATTEMPTS wrong entries per issued OTP,
// so the 6-digit code cannot be brute-forced inside its 5-minute window.
if (!hash_equals((string)$_SESSION['reset_otp'], trim($otp_input)) || $user_id <= 0) {
$_SESSION['reset_attempts'] = (int)($_SESSION['reset_attempts'] ?? 0) + 1;
if ($_SESSION['reset_attempts'] >= self::OTP_MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
$this->clearSession();
throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Too many incorrect OTP attempts. Please request a new OTP.');
}
throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Incorrect OTP. Please try again.');
}
@@ -234,6 +270,39 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
exit;
}
/**
* Handle the login-page request-OTP call. The answer is the same whether or
* not the username/email matches an account (no account enumeration): no
* masked email, a generic message and a reference number. Mail failures are
* logged, not reported, for the same reason.
*
* On success (always): { success: 1, message: PUBLIC_REQUEST_MESSAGE, reference: "ABCDEF" }
*
* @param int|null $user_id Resolved account, or null when nothing matched.
* @param int $company_id Company SMTP scope (0 = use system default).
*/
public function handleRequestOtpPublic(?int $user_id, int $company_id = 0): void {
$reference = null;
if ($user_id) {
try {
$reference = $this->requestOtp($user_id, $company_id)['reference'];
} catch (\Exception $e) {
error_log('[PasswordResetManager::handleRequestOtpPublic] ' . $e->getMessage());
}
}
if ($reference === null) {
$reference = $this->startDecoy();
}
echo json_encode([
'success' => 1,
'message' => self::PUBLIC_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
'reference' => $reference,
]);
exit;
}
/**
* Handle an AJAX confirm-reset call and echo a JSON response.
*
@@ -312,23 +381,17 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
}
/**
* Convert a positive integer into a base-26 uppercase letter string.
* Random 6-letter uppercase reference code (e.g. "BCDFHJ") for the reset email
* and the confirmation screen. Carries no information about the OTP.
*
* Used to turn the numeric reference OTP into a human-friendly 6-letter
* reference code (e.g. 123456 → "BCDFHJ") for inclusion in the reset email.
* The result is left-padded with 'A' to always return a 6-character string.
*
* @param int $num Positive integer to convert.
* @return string 6-character uppercase string (e.g. "AAAABC").
* @return string 6-character uppercase string.
*/
private function numberToLetters(int $num): string {
private function randomReference(): string {
$result = '';
while ($num > 0) {
$mod = ($num - 1) % 26;
$result = chr(65 + $mod) . $result;
$num = intval(($num - $mod) / 26);
for ($i = 0; $i < 6; $i++) {
$result .= chr(65 + random_int(0, 25));
}
return str_pad($result, 6, 'A', STR_PAD_LEFT);
return $result;
}
/**
@@ -356,14 +419,15 @@ class PasswordResetManager {
*
* Called on OTP expiry (to invalidate the request) and on successful
* reset (before session_destroy). Does not destroy the full session —
* only the 4 reset-specific keys are unset.
* only the reset-specific keys are unset.
*/
private function clearSession(): void {
unset(
$_SESSION['reset_otp'],
$_SESSION['reset_otp_time'],
$_SESSION['reset_reference'],
$_SESSION['reset_user_id']
$_SESSION['reset_user_id'],
$_SESSION['reset_attempts']
);
}
}
app/assets/utils/rate_limit.php
+99
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
<?php
/**
* rate_limit.php — DB-backed request throttle for the unauthenticated login,
* OTP and registration endpoints.
*
* Counters live in wms.auth_throttle (created by setup.php), not in the PHP
* session: an attacker simply drops the session cookie to reset a session
* counter. Each (bucket, key) pair counts hits in a fixed window; keys are
* stored as SHA-256 hashes so the table never holds raw IPs or emails.
*
* The helper fails open: if the table is missing or the query fails, the error
* is logged and the request is allowed, so a schema problem can never lock
* every user out of the login page.
*
* Usage:
* require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
* rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
* ['login_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 20, 900],
* ['login_user', $username, 10, 900],
* ]);
*/
if (!function_exists('rate_limit_client_ip')) {
/**
* The client address as Apache sees it. X-Forwarded-For is deliberately not
* trusted here: any client can send it, which would let them pick a fresh
* key for every request.
*/
function rate_limit_client_ip(): string {
return (string)($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? '');
}
}
if (!function_exists('rate_limit_hit')) {
/**
* Count one hit for ($bucket, $key) and report whether the limit is exceeded.
*
* @param PDO $pdo Connection to the wms (auth) database.
* @param string $bucket Endpoint/purpose name, e.g. 'login_ip'.
* @param string $key Raw key (IP, normalised username/email, user id).
* @param int $max Hits allowed per window.
* @param int $window_seconds Window length in seconds.
* @return bool true when this hit is over the limit.
*/
function rate_limit_hit(PDO $pdo, string $bucket, string $key, int $max, int $window_seconds): bool {
if ($key === '') return false;
$key_hash = hash('sha256', $bucket . '|' . $key);
try {
// One statement per hit: a new row starts at 1; an existing row either
// restarts its window (expired) or counts up. MySQL applies the SET
// list left to right, so `hits` still sees the old window_start.
$pdo->prepare(
"INSERT INTO auth_throttle (bucket, key_hash, window_start, hits)
VALUES (:b, :k, NOW(), 1)
ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE
hits = IF(window_start < NOW() - INTERVAL :w1 SECOND, 1, hits + 1),
window_start = IF(window_start < NOW() - INTERVAL :w2 SECOND, NOW(), window_start)"
)->execute([':b' => $bucket, ':k' => $key_hash, ':w1' => $window_seconds, ':w2' => $window_seconds]);
$sth = $pdo->prepare("SELECT hits FROM auth_throttle WHERE bucket = :b AND key_hash = :k");
$sth->execute([':b' => $bucket, ':k' => $key_hash]);
return (int)$sth->fetchColumn() > $max;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
error_log('[rate_limit] throttle check skipped (' . $bucket . '): ' . $e->getMessage());
return false;
}
}
}
if (!function_exists('rate_limit_guard')) {
/**
* Count every check and stop the request with HTTP 429 if any is over its
* limit. Each check is [bucket, key, max, window_seconds].
*/
function rate_limit_guard(PDO $pdo, array $checks): void {
$limited = false;
foreach ($checks as [$bucket, $key, $max, $window]) {
if (rate_limit_hit($pdo, $bucket, (string)$key, (int)$max, (int)$window)) {
$limited = true;
}
}
if ($limited) {
rate_limit_reject();
}
}
}
if (!function_exists('rate_limit_reject')) {
/** Answer 429 with the same generic message everywhere and stop. */
function rate_limit_reject(): void {
http_response_code(429);
header('Retry-After: 300');
exit(json_encode([
'success' => 0,
'message' => 'Too many requests. Please wait a few minutes and try again.',
'code' => 'rate_limited',
]));
}
}
app/login/api/engine/accept_invite.php
+1 -1
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ $token = $_SESSION['accept_invite_token'];
// ── Step 2: CSRF check ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$csrf = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_CSRF_TOKEN'] ?? '';
if (empty($csrf) || $csrf !== ($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? '')) {
if (empty($csrf) || !hash_equals((string)($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? ''), $csrf)) {
http_response_code(403);
$answer['message'] = 'Invalid request.';
exit(json_encode($answer));
app/login/api/engine/invited_onboarding.php
+1 -1
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ $token = $_SESSION['invited_token'];
// ── Step 2: CSRF check ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$csrf = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_CSRF_TOKEN'] ?? '';
if (empty($csrf) || $csrf !== ($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? '')) {
if (empty($csrf) || !hash_equals((string)($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? ''), $csrf)) {
http_response_code(403);
$answer['message'] = 'Invalid request.';
exit(json_encode($answer));
app/login/api/engine/login_confirm.php
+36 -29
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@
* 4. Check both conditions that must be true for the OTP to be valid:
* a. The submitted OTP matches the re-derived expected value.
* b. The elapsed time since otpTime is ≤ 5 minutes.
* Fail either → return "Wrong OTP! Please try again."
* Fail either → HTTP 401 "Wrong OTP! Please try again." After
* LOGIN_OTP_MAX_ATTEMPTS wrong codes the pending login is cleared and the
* user must enter the password again (code "login_restart").
* 5. On success:
* a. Concurrent-session check — if the account already has a session_token
* set and session_last_seen is within SESSION_ACTIVE_GRACE_SECONDS
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@
* cannot forge a valid OTP without also knowing the password hash.
*
* Session keys read:
* login_data['username'], login_data['password'], login_user_id, otpTime
* login_user_id, password_verified_at, otpTime, otp_attempts, skip_otp
*
* Session keys written:
* login_status, login_username, login_name, login_surname, login_company_id,
@@ -50,7 +52,8 @@
*
* Response JSON:
* On success: { "success": 1, "message": "Login Complete!" }
* On failure: { "message": "Wrong OTP! Please try again. (Our OTP is valid for 5 minute)" }
* On failure: { "message": "Wrong OTP! Please try again. (Our OTP is valid for 5 minute)" } — HTTP 401
* (429 when throttled, 409 when signed in on another device)
*/
require_once '../../../session.php';
@@ -59,11 +62,21 @@ require_once '../../../preset.php';
define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/otp_policy.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
require_once '../login_helpers.php';
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['login_confirm_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 60, 900],
]);
// ── Step 1: Load session state written by login_otp.php ───────────────────────
$data["username"] = $_SESSION["login_data"]['username'];
$data["password"] = $_SESSION["login_data"]['password'];
$user_id = $_SESSION["login_user_id"];
// A pending login exists only after login_otp.php verified the password, and
// only for LOGIN_PENDING_SECONDS; anything else must start again from step 1.
if (!login_pending_valid()) {
$_SESSION = [];
login_fail(401, 'Your sign-in has expired. Please enter your username and password again.', ['code' => 'login_restart']);
}
$user_id = (int)$_SESSION["login_user_id"];
// ── Step 2: Fetch user record — need password hash to re-derive the OTP ───────
$sth = $pdo1->prepare("select * from user where user_id = :user_id limit 1;");
@@ -74,18 +87,7 @@ $temp = $sth->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
// Uses $_SESSION['otpTime'] (set when the OTP was generated) as the TOTP
// counter base. This is the same algorithm used in login_otp.php and
// request_new_otp.php — any change to one must be reflected in all three.
function generateOTP($sercet_key, $time_step = 180, $length = 6) {
$counter = floor($_SESSION["otpTime"] / $time_step);
$data = pack("NN", 0, $counter);
$hash = hash_hmac('sha1', $data, $sercet_key, true);
$offset = ord(substr($hash, -1)) & 0x0F;
$value = unpack("N", substr($hash, $offset, 4));
$otp = ($value[1] & 0x7FFFFFFF) % pow(10, $length);
return str_pad(strval($otp), $length, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT);
}
$otp = generateOTP($temp["password"]);
$otp = login_generate_otp((string)($temp["password"] ?? ''), (int)($_SESSION["otpTime"] ?? 0));
// ── Step 3b: Calculate elapsed time since OTP was issued ──────────────────────
// otpTime is the Unix timestamp stored by login_otp.php when the OTP was sent.
@@ -95,10 +97,6 @@ $now = time();
$otp_diff_seconds = max(0, $now - $otp_time);
$otp_diff_minutes = $otp_diff_seconds / 60.0;
// Store for debug convenience — visible in $_SESSION on the session inspect page
$_SESSION["now"] = $now;
$_SESSION["diff"] = $otp_diff_minutes;
// ── Step 4: Validate OTP value and expiry ─────────────────────────────────────
// Skipped for staff/viewer roles — login_otp.php sets skip_otp=true in session
// so they never receive or enter an OTP. Admin/owner always go through this check,
@@ -109,9 +107,15 @@ if (empty($_SESSION['skip_otp'])) {
if (!empty($user_id)) {
otp_log_bypass($user_id, 'login_confirm');
}
} elseif ($data["otp"] != $otp || $otp_diff_minutes > 5) {
$answer["message"] = "Wrong OTP! Please try again. (Our OTP is valid for 5 minute)";
exit(json_encode($answer));
} elseif (!hash_equals($otp, trim((string)($data["otp"] ?? ''))) || $otp_diff_minutes > 5) {
// Count wrong codes per issued OTP; the 6-digit code must not be
// guessable by brute force within its 5-minute window.
$_SESSION['otp_attempts'] = (int)($_SESSION['otp_attempts'] ?? 0) + 1;
if ($_SESSION['otp_attempts'] >= LOGIN_OTP_MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
$_SESSION = [];
login_fail(401, 'Too many incorrect OTP attempts. Please sign in again.', ['code' => 'login_restart']);
}
login_fail(401, "Wrong OTP! Please try again. (Our OTP is valid for 5 minute)");
}
}
@@ -157,8 +161,7 @@ $sth_active->execute([':uid' => $user_id]);
$active_row = $sth_active->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
if (!empty($active_row['session_token']) && !empty($active_row['is_active'])) {
$answer['message'] = 'This account is currently signed in on another device. Please sign out from that session first.';
exit(json_encode($answer));
login_fail(409, 'This account is currently signed in on another device. Please sign out from that session first.');
}
// ── Step 4c: Claim session ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -179,8 +182,8 @@ $sth_claim->execute([
]);
if ($sth_claim->rowCount() !== 1) {
$answer["message"] = "Login failed: user record not found.";
exit(json_encode($answer));
$_SESSION = [];
login_fail(401, "Login failed: user record not found.", ['code' => 'login_restart']);
}
// ── Step 5a: Regenerate session ID ────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -189,6 +192,10 @@ if ($sth_claim->rowCount() !== 1) {
// a session ID before the user logs in.
session_regenerate_id(true);
// The pending-login keys are done with once the user is signed in.
unset($_SESSION['login_data'], $_SESSION['password_verified_at'], $_SESSION['otp_attempts'],
$_SESSION['otp_resends'], $_SESSION['reference'], $_SESSION['skip_otp']);
// ── Step 5b: Issue CSRF token ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
// A fresh 256-bit token is generated here and stored in session. All subsequent
// POST requests from the authenticated app must include this token in the
app/login/api/engine/login_otp.php
+56 -61
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
* 1. Resolve user_id by username or email (case-insensitive).
* 2. Fetch hashed password and full user record.
* 3. Verify submitted password via password_verify().
* 4. On failure → clear cookies, return "Incorrect Password".
* 4. On failure (unknown user, wrong password or locked account) → clear
* cookies, HTTP 401 with one generic message (LOGIN_GENERIC_FAILURE).
* 5. On success → run the following pre-login checks in order:
* a. Email format guard (malformed email → block with message).
* b. Unverified account (status = 'pending'):
@@ -31,17 +32,20 @@
* - Note: 'support' user and 'lord' licence bypass this check.
* e. Licence expiry check: if now > $expire + 1 day → return "expire".
* 6. Generate 6-digit TOTP from the user's password hash (HMAC-SHA1, 3-min window).
* 7. Generate a 6-letter human-readable reference number from the TOTP.
* 7. Generate a random 6-letter reference number (not derived from the OTP).
* 8. If the user's default_company has a company_smtp row → send OTP email.
* If no SMTP configured → skip email, set skip_otp flag in response.
* 9. Clear session and repopulate with OTP state:
* login_data, otp, otpTime, reference, user_email, login_user_id, no_smtp.
* login_data (username only), password_verified_at, otp, otpTime,
* reference, user_email, login_user_id, no_smtp.
* 10. Return { success: 1, skip_otp: bool, message: "Login Complete!" }.
* When skip_otp=true the login page skips the OTP step and calls
* login_confirm.php directly.
*
* Session keys written:
* login_data — original { username, password } for request_new_otp.php
* login_data — { username } only; the password is never stored
* password_verified_at — when the password was checked (request_new_otp.php,
* login_confirm.php require it to be recent)
* otp — the generated TOTP value
* otpTime — Unix timestamp the OTP was generated (used for expiry check)
* reference — 6-letter reference code shown on the OTP screen
@@ -51,7 +55,7 @@
*
* Response JSON:
* On success: { "success": 1, "skip_otp": bool, "message": "Login Complete!" }
* On failure: { "message": "<reason>" }
* On failure: { "message": "<reason>" } with HTTP 401/403 (429 when throttled)
* Special: { "message": "wait" } — device pending whitelist approval
* { "message": "block" } — device is blacklisted
* { "expire": "expire" } — licence has expired
@@ -63,28 +67,36 @@ require_once '../../../preset.php';
define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/otp_policy.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
require_once '../login_helpers.php';
$username = strtolower(trim((string)($data["username"] ?? '')));
// ── Step 0: Throttle — per client IP and per account name ────────────────────
// The per-user lockout below only counts real accounts; this also slows
// password spraying across many usernames from one address.
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['login_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 30, 900],
['login_user', $username, 15, 900],
]);
// ── Step 1: Resolve user_id from username or email (case-insensitive) ────────
$sth = $pdo1->prepare("select user_id from user where ? in (username,email) ");
$sth->execute(array(strtolower($data["username"])));
$sth->execute(array($username));
$user_id = $sth->fetchColumn();
$username = strtolower($data["username"]);
// ── Step 2: Fetch the user's hashed password + lockout state ─────────────────
$sth = $pdo1->prepare("SELECT password, login_attempts, locked_until FROM user WHERE username = ? OR email = ? LIMIT 1;");
$sth->execute(array($username, $username));
$temp = $sth->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
// ── Step 2a: Lockout check — only when the username resolves to a real user ──
// We only block here when $user_id is set (valid username) to avoid leaking
// whether an account exists via a different error message.
// A locked account gets the same generic answer as a wrong password, so the
// lockout cannot be used to confirm that an account exists.
if ($user_id && !empty($temp['locked_until'])) {
if (strtotime($temp['locked_until']) > time()) {
// Still within the lockout window — reject
$retry_at = date('H:i', strtotime($temp['locked_until']));
$answer['message'] = "Too many failed attempts. Please try again after {$retry_at}.";
exit(json_encode($answer));
login_fail(401, LOGIN_GENERIC_FAILURE);
} else {
// Lockout has expired — reset counter so they get a fresh 10 attempts
$pdo1->prepare("UPDATE user SET login_attempts = 0, locked_until = NULL WHERE user_id = :id")
@@ -94,7 +106,7 @@ if ($user_id && !empty($temp['locked_until'])) {
}
// ── Step 3–4: Verify password — exit with error on mismatch ──────────────────
if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
if ($temp && password_verify(trim((string)($data["password"] ?? '')), $temp["password"])) {
// ── Reset lockout on successful password verification ─────────────────────
if ($user_id) {
@@ -120,8 +132,8 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// Blocks accounts with a malformed email (e.g. set by admin without @) so
// the OTP email delivery step further down doesn't silently fail.
if (strpos($user_email, "@") === false) {
$answer["message"] = "<b>" . $user_email . "</b> is not eligible email, please contact your administrator to change your email.";
exit(json_encode($answer));
// The message is rendered as HTML by bootbox — escape the stored value.
login_fail(403, "<b>" . htmlspecialchars((string)$user_email, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</b> is not eligible email, please contact your administrator to change your email.");
}
// ── Step 5c: Unverified account (status = 'pending') ─────────────────────
@@ -166,6 +178,7 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
'key' => $pinkey,
]);
http_response_code(403);
if ($mail_sent) {
$answer["message"] = "Your email is not verified. We've sent a new verification link to your inbox — please check your email.";
} else {
@@ -177,8 +190,7 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// ── Step 5d: Deactivated account ─────────────────────────────────────────
if ($r["status"] === "not activated") {
$answer["message"] = "Your account has been deactivated. Please contact your administrator.";
exit(json_encode($answer));
login_fail(403, "Your account has been deactivated. Please contact your administrator.");
}
// ── Step 5e: Secure-login device whitelist check ──────────────────────────
@@ -202,11 +214,13 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
$s->execute(array(":cookie" => $data["cookie"], ":ip" => $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]));
session_destroy();
http_response_code(403);
$answer["message"] = "wait";
setcookie("u", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h1", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h2", "", time() - 1, "/");
echo json_encode($answer);
// Stop here: the session is gone, nothing below may run.
exit(json_encode($answer));
} else {
@@ -216,6 +230,7 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// Device explicitly blocked by admin
session_destroy();
http_response_code(403);
$answer["message"] = "block";
setcookie("u", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h1", "", time() - 1, "/");
@@ -223,11 +238,13 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
echo json_encode($answer);
$deviceDecision = ['type' => 'BLOCKED', 'status' => 0];
exit;
} else if ($coo["status"] == "1") {
// Device registered but not yet approved — notify admin
session_destroy();
http_response_code(403);
$answer["message"] = "wait";
setcookie("u", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h1", "", time() - 1, "/");
@@ -250,7 +267,9 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// If the licence expired more than 1 day ago, reject the login.
if (strtotime("now") > strtotime($expire . " + 1 day")) {
session_destroy();
$answer["expire"] = "expire";
http_response_code(403);
$answer["expire"] = "expire";
$answer["message"] = "Your licence has expired. Please contact your administrator.";
exit(json_encode($answer));
}
@@ -273,10 +292,12 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
if (!$requires_otp) {
$_SESSION = [];
$_SESSION['login_data'] = $data;
$_SESSION['login_user_id'] = $user_id;
$_SESSION['otpTime'] = time();
$_SESSION['skip_otp'] = true;
session_regenerate_id(true);
$_SESSION['login_data'] = ['username' => $username];
$_SESSION['password_verified_at'] = time();
$_SESSION['login_user_id'] = $user_id;
$_SESSION['otpTime'] = time();
$_SESSION['skip_otp'] = true;
$answer['success'] = 1;
$answer['skip_otp'] = true;
$answer['message'] = 'Login Complete!';
@@ -287,38 +308,12 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// The secret key is the user's current password hash, so the OTP is unique
// per user and automatically invalidated if the password changes.
// time_step=180 means the OTP window is 3 minutes (same counter for 3 min).
function generateOTP($sercet_key, $time_step = 180, $length = 6) {
global $otpTime;
$otpTime = time(); // captured globally so it can be stored in session
$counter = floor($otpTime / $time_step);
$data = pack("NN", 0, $counter);
$hash = hash_hmac('sha1', $data, $sercet_key, true);
$offset = ord(substr($hash, -1)) & 0x0F;
$value = unpack("N", substr($hash, $offset, 4));
$otp = ($value[1] & 0x7FFFFFFF) % pow(10, $length);
return str_pad(strval($otp), $length, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT);
}
$otpTime = time();
$otp = login_generate_otp($temp["password"], $otpTime);
// ── Step 7: Generate 6-letter reference number ───────────────────────────
// Converts a second TOTP (derived from the first OTP as key) to a base-26
// uppercase letter string. Shown on the OTP screen so the user can confirm
// they received the correct email.
function numberToLetters($num) {
$result = '';
while ($num > 0) {
$mod = ($num - 1) % 26;
$result = chr(65 + $mod) . $result;
$num = intval(($num - $mod) / 26);
}
return str_pad($result, 6, 'A', STR_PAD_LEFT);
}
$otp = generateOTP($temp["password"]);
$reference_number = numberToLetters(generateOTP($otp));
// Random, shown on the OTP screen so the user can match it to the email.
$reference_number = login_random_reference();
// ── Step 8: Look up company SMTP and send OTP email ──────────────────────
// Uses the SMTP settings saved for the user's default_company.
@@ -371,8 +366,12 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// The full session is cleared first to prevent session fixation — any data
// from a previous partial login attempt is discarded before writing new state.
$_SESSION = [];
session_regenerate_id(true);
$_SESSION["login_data"] = $data; // preserved for request_new_otp.php resend flow
$_SESSION["login_data"] = ['username' => $username]; // never the password
$_SESSION["password_verified_at"] = time(); // request_new_otp.php / login_confirm.php require it to be recent
$_SESSION["otp_attempts"] = 0;
$_SESSION["otp_resends"] = 0;
$_SESSION["otp"] = $otp; // expected value for login_confirm.php to verify
$_SESSION["otpTime"] = $otpTime; // timestamp for the 5-minute expiry window
$_SESSION["reference"] = $reference_number; // shown on OTP input screen
@@ -394,27 +393,23 @@ if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// ── Password mismatch ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Only increment the counter when the username is valid — wrong usernames
// don't count so a typo in your own name doesn't eat your own attempts.
// Every failure gets the same generic message (no username enumeration).
if ($user_id) {
$attempts = (int)($temp['login_attempts'] ?? 0) + 1;
if ($attempts >= 5) {
$locked_until = date('Y-m-d H:i:s', strtotime('+30 minutes'));
$pdo1->prepare("UPDATE user SET login_attempts = :a, locked_until = :l WHERE user_id = :id")
->execute([':a' => $attempts, ':l' => $locked_until, ':id' => $user_id]);
$retry_at = date('H:i', strtotime($locked_until));
$answer['message'] = "Too many failed attempts. Please try again after {$retry_at}.";
} else {
$pdo1->prepare("UPDATE user SET login_attempts = :a WHERE user_id = :id")
->execute([':a' => $attempts, ':id' => $user_id]);
$answer['message'] = "Incorrect Password";
}
} else {
$answer['message'] = "Incorrect Username";
}
setcookie("u", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h1", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h2", "", time() - 1, "/");
exit(json_encode($answer));
login_fail(401, LOGIN_GENERIC_FAILURE);
}
$answer["success"] = 1;
app/login/api/engine/onboarding.php
+10 -2
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ require_once '../../../config.php';
require_once '../../../dbconn.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_helpers.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/otp_policy.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/secret_box.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8');
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ if ($sth->fetchColumn() !== 'owner') {
// ── Step 2: CSRF check ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$csrf = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_CSRF_TOKEN'] ?? '';
if (empty($csrf) || $csrf !== ($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? '')) {
if (empty($csrf) || !hash_equals((string)($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? ''), $csrf)) {
http_response_code(403);
$answer['message'] = 'Invalid request.';
exit(json_encode($answer));
@@ -94,6 +96,12 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$data = json_decode($_POST['json'] ?? '{}', true) ?: [];
// ── Step 2b: Throttle — each attempt sends an SMTP test email ────────────────
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['onboarding_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 20, 900],
['onboarding_user', (string)$user_id, 10, 900],
]);
try {
// ── Step 3: Sanitise input ────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -147,7 +155,7 @@ try {
// ── Step 7: Encrypt SMTP password ────────────────────────────────────
// Uses the same OpenSSL method/iv/key as the rest of the app (from config.php)
// so the stored password can be decrypted by the mailer module.
$encrypted_pass = openssl_encrypt($smtp_password, $method, $pinkey, 0, $iv);
$encrypted_pass = secret_encrypt($smtp_password, $pinkey);
// Assemble a temporary SMTP config for the test send (step 8)
$smtp_config = [
app/login/api/engine/register.php
+8 -1
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ require_once '../../../config.php';
require_once '../../../dbconn.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_helpers.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/classes/PasswordManager.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8');
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ $answer = ['success' => 0, 'message' => ''];
// stored in session. This prevents cross-site request forgery on the register form.
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$csrf = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_CSRF_TOKEN'] ?? '';
if (empty($csrf) || $csrf !== ($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? '')) {
if (empty($csrf) || !hash_equals((string)($_SESSION['csrf_token'] ?? ''), $csrf)) {
http_response_code(403);
$answer['message'] = 'Invalid request.';
exit(json_encode($answer));
@@ -67,6 +68,12 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$data = json_decode($_POST['json'] ?? '{}', true) ?: [];
// ── Step 1b: Throttle — every registration sends a verification email ────────
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['register_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 10, 3600],
['register_email', strtolower(trim((string)($data['email'] ?? ''))), 3, 3600],
]);
try {
// ── Step 2: Sanitise input ────────────────────────────────────────────────
app/login/api/engine/request_new_otp.php
+99 -134
View File
@@ -4,42 +4,31 @@
*
* Called by: login page AJAX "Resend OTP" button on the OTP input screen.
* Input: All data sourced from $_SESSION (written by login_otp.php).
* No new user input is accepted — credentials are re-read from session
* to avoid re-exposing the password in a second HTTP request.
* No new user input is accepted.
*
* This endpoint regenerates a fresh TOTP and resends the OTP email without
* requiring the user to re-enter their username and password. It is only
* reachable after login_otp.php has successfully validated credentials and
* written the login session state.
* reachable while a pending login exists: login_otp.php verified the password
* less than LOGIN_PENDING_SECONDS ago (password_verified_at). The password
* itself is never kept in the session, so it is not re-checked here.
*
* Full flow:
* 1. Reload username, password, and user_id from session.
* 2. Fetch the full user row (need the password hash to regenerate OTP
* and the email address to resend to).
* 3. Re-verify the stored password against the session-stored hash.
* This is a safety re-check — the session could theoretically have been
* tampered with between login_otp.php and this call.
* 4. On password mismatch → clear cookies, return "Incorrect Password".
* 5. On success:
* a. Generate a fresh 6-digit TOTP (new timestamp → new OTP).
* b. Generate a new 6-letter reference number.
* c. Send the OTP email via system SMTP ($SMTP from config.php).
* Note: uses system-level SMTP unconditionally (unlike login_otp.php
* which tries the company SMTP first). The if(true) wrapper is a
* placeholder left from the original — email always sends.
* d. Clear session and repopulate with new OTP state.
* 6. Return { success: 1, message: "Login Complete!" }.
* 1. Require a fresh pending login; otherwise HTTP 401 (code "login_restart").
* 2. Throttle: per client IP, per user, and at most LOGIN_OTP_MAX_RESENDS
* resends per pending login (HTTP 429).
* 3. Fetch the user row (password hash for the OTP, email to send to).
* 4. Generate a fresh 6-digit TOTP (new timestamp → new OTP) and a random
* 6-letter reference number.
* 5. Send the OTP email with the same SMTP choice as login_otp.php: the
* default company's SMTP when configured, otherwise the system $SMTP.
* 6. Write the new OTP state (the wrong-attempt counter restarts).
* 7. Return { success: 1, message: "Login Complete!" }.
*
* Session keys read:
* login_data['username'], login_data['password'], login_user_id
* login_user_id, password_verified_at, otp_resends
*
* Session keys overwritten:
* login_data, otp, otpTime, reference, user_email, login_user_id
* (same keys as login_otp.php — login_confirm.php reads the same structure)
*
* Response JSON:
* On success: { "success": 1, "message": "Login Complete!" }
* On failure: { "message": "Incorrect Password" }
* otp, otpTime, reference, user_email, otp_attempts, otp_resends
*/
require_once '../../../session.php';
@@ -47,120 +36,96 @@ require_once '../../../config.php';
require_once '../../../preset.php';
define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
require_once '../login_helpers.php';
// ── Step 1: Reload credentials from session ───────────────────────────────────
// These were stored by login_otp.php so the user doesn't have to retype them.
$data["username"] = $_SESSION["login_data"]['username'];
$data["password"] = $_SESSION["login_data"]['password'];
$user_id = (int)$_SESSION["login_user_id"];
// ── Step 1: Require a pending login ───────────────────────────────────────────
if (!login_pending_valid()) {
$_SESSION = [];
login_fail(401, 'Your sign-in has expired. Please enter your username and password again.', ['code' => 'login_restart']);
}
$user_id = (int)$_SESSION["login_user_id"];
// ── Step 2: Fetch user record ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ── Step 2: Throttle resends ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
if ((int)($_SESSION['otp_resends'] ?? 0) >= LOGIN_OTP_MAX_RESENDS) {
rate_limit_reject();
}
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['otp_resend_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 10, 900],
['otp_resend_user', (string)$user_id, 5, 900],
]);
// ── Step 3: Fetch user record ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
$sth = $pdo1->prepare("select * from user where user_id = :user_id limit 1;");
$sth->execute([":user_id" => $user_id]);
$temp = $sth->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
$user_email = $temp["email"];
// ── Step 3–4: Re-verify password ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// Safety check — ensures the session hasn't been tampered with between
// login_otp.php and this resend call.
if (password_verify(trim($data["password"]), $temp["password"])) {
// ── Step 5a: Generate fresh 6-digit TOTP ──────────────────────────────────
// Same HMAC-SHA1 algorithm as login_otp.php and login_confirm.php.
// A new $otpTime is captured so the OTP window resets from this moment.
function generateOTP($sercet_key, $time_step = 180, $length = 6) {
global $otpTime;
$otpTime = time(); // new timestamp — extends the 5-minute validity window
$counter = floor($otpTime / $time_step);
$data = pack("NN", 0, $counter);
$hash = hash_hmac('sha1', $data, $sercet_key, true);
$offset = ord(substr($hash, -1)) & 0x0F;
$value = unpack("N", substr($hash, $offset, 4));
$otp = ($value[1] & 0x7FFFFFFF) % pow(10, $length);
return str_pad(strval($otp), $length, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT);
}
// ── Step 5b: Generate 6-letter reference number ───────────────────────────
// Converts a second TOTP (derived from the first OTP as the key) to a
// base-26 uppercase letter string shown on the OTP input screen.
function numberToLetters($num) {
$result = '';
while ($num > 0) {
$mod = ($num - 1) % 26;
$result = chr(65 + $mod) . $result;
$num = intval(($num - $mod) / 26);
}
return str_pad($result, 6, 'A', STR_PAD_LEFT);
}
$otp = generateOTP($temp["password"]);
$reference_number = numberToLetters(generateOTP($otp));
// ── Step 5c: Send OTP email ───────────────────────────────────────────────
// Uses the system-level $SMTP config from config.php.
// The if(true) wrapper is a no-op placeholder from the original code —
// the email block always executes.
require "../../../assets/utils/module/mailer.php";
if (true) {
$mailer = new mailer(["pdo1" => $pdo1]);
$mailer->send_email([
"company_id" => 0,
"smtp" => $SMTP,
"subject" => "One Time Password (OTP) For reference number " . $reference_number,
"message" => implode("\n", [
"Dear WMS user,",
"",
"You requested a One-Time Password (OTP) to log in to WMS.",
"",
"Please use the OTP below to complete your request:",
"• OTP code: " . $otp,
"• Reference number: " . $reference_number,
"",
"Please note:",
"• This code will expire in 3 minutes. Please complete your action promptly.",
"• Do not share this code with anyone to keep your account secure.",
"• If you did not request this code, please ignore this email.",
]),
"channel_name" => "WMS LOGIN OTP ",
"to" => $user_email,
"key" => $pinkey,
]);
}
// ── Step 5d: Reset session with new OTP state ─────────────────────────────
// Full session is cleared before repopulating to avoid stale state
// from the previous OTP attempt leaking into this one.
if (!$temp) {
$_SESSION = [];
$_SESSION["login_data"] = $data;
$_SESSION["otp"] = $otp;
$_SESSION["otpTime"] = $otpTime; // new timestamp — login_confirm.php uses this
$_SESSION["reference"] = $reference_number;
$_SESSION["user_email"] = $user_email;
$_SESSION["login_user_id"] = $user_id;
// ── Step 6: Respond ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
$answer["success"] = 1;
$answer["message"] = "Login Complete!";
exit(json_encode($answer));
} else {
// ── Password mismatch — clear cookies and reject ──────────────────────────
$answer["message"] = "Incorrect Password";
setcookie("u", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h1", "", time() - 1, "/");
setcookie("h2", "", time() - 1, "/");
exit(json_encode($answer));
login_fail(401, 'Your sign-in has expired. Please enter your username and password again.', ['code' => 'login_restart']);
}
$user_email = $temp["email"];
// ── Step 4: Generate fresh 6-digit TOTP + random reference ────────────────────
// Same HMAC-SHA1 algorithm as login_otp.php and login_confirm.php.
// A new $otpTime is captured so the OTP window resets from this moment.
$otpTime = time();
$otp = login_generate_otp($temp["password"], $otpTime);
$reference_number = login_random_reference();
// ── Step 5: Send OTP email ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Company SMTP of the user's default company when configured, otherwise the
// system-level $SMTP from config.php.
$smtp_config = $SMTP;
$default_company = (int)($temp["default_company"] ?? 0);
if ($default_company > 0) {
$sth = $pdo1->prepare("SELECT * FROM company_smtp WHERE company_id = :cid LIMIT 1");
$sth->execute([":cid" => $default_company]);
$smtp_row = $sth->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
if (!empty($smtp_row)) {
$smtp_config = $smtp_row;
}
}
require "../../../assets/utils/module/mailer.php";
$mailer = new mailer(["pdo1" => $pdo1, "pdo2" => $pdo2]);
$mailer->send_email([
"company_id" => $smtp_config === $SMTP ? 0 : $default_company,
"smtp" => $smtp_config,
"subject" => "One Time Password (OTP) For reference number " . $reference_number,
"message" => implode("\n", [
"Dear WMS user,",
"",
"You requested a One-Time Password (OTP) to log in to WMS.",
"",
"Please use the OTP below to complete your request:",
"• OTP code: " . $otp,
"• Reference number: " . $reference_number,
"",
"Please note:",
"• This code will expire in 3 minutes. Please complete your action promptly.",
"• Do not share this code with anyone to keep your account secure.",
"• If you did not request this code, please ignore this email.",
]),
"channel_name" => "WMS LOGIN OTP ",
"to" => $user_email,
"key" => $pinkey,
]);
// ── Step 6: Write the new OTP state ───────────────────────────────────────────
// The pending-login keys (login_data, login_user_id, password_verified_at) stay
// as they are; only the OTP state is replaced.
$_SESSION["otp"] = $otp;
$_SESSION["otpTime"] = $otpTime; // new timestamp — login_confirm.php uses this
$_SESSION["reference"] = $reference_number;
$_SESSION["user_email"] = $user_email;
$_SESSION["otp_attempts"] = 0;
$_SESSION["otp_resends"] = (int)($_SESSION["otp_resends"] ?? 0) + 1;
// ── Step 7: Respond ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
$answer["success"] = 1;
exit(json_encode($answer));
$answer["message"] = "Login Complete!";
exit(json_encode($answer));
app/login/api/engine/request_reset_otp.php
+16 -9
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,16 @@
<?php
/**
* request_reset_otp.php — login page "Forgot password?" step 1.
*
* Unauthenticated. Answers the same way whether or not the username/email
* matches an account (see PasswordResetManager::handleRequestOtpPublic), and is
* throttled per client IP and per identifier because every hit can send email.
*/
require_once '../../../session.php';
define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
// Resolve user by username or email
$identifier = strtolower(trim($data['identifier'] ?? ''));
@@ -13,22 +21,21 @@ if (!$identifier) {
exit(json_encode($answer));
}
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['reset_req_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 10, 900],
['reset_req_id', $identifier, 3, 900],
]);
$sth = $pdo1->prepare(
"SELECT user_id, default_company FROM user WHERE username = :i OR email = :i LIMIT 1"
);
$sth->execute([':i' => $identifier]);
$user = $sth->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
if (!$user) {
http_response_code(404);
$answer['message'] = 'No account found with that username or email.';
exit(json_encode($answer));
}
$user_id = (int)$user['user_id'];
$company_id = (int)($user['default_company'] ?? 0);
$user_id = $user ? (int)$user['user_id'] : null;
$company_id = $user ? (int)($user['default_company'] ?? 0) : 0;
require_once '../../../assets/utils/classes/PasswordResetManager.php';
$manager = new PasswordResetManager($pdo1, $pdo2, $include_url, $SMTP, $pinkey);
$manager->handleRequestOtp($user_id, $company_id);
$manager->handleRequestOtpPublic($user_id, $company_id);
app/login/api/engine/reset_password_otp.php
+14 -1
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,23 @@
<?php
/**
* reset_password_otp.php — login page "Forgot password?" step 2.
*
* Unauthenticated. Needs the reset state written by request_reset_otp.php in
* this session. For a username that matched no account that state is a decoy
* (reset_user_id 0) which always answers "Incorrect OTP", so this step does not
* reveal whether the account exists either.
*/
require_once '../../../session.php';
define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
if (empty($_SESSION['reset_user_id'])) {
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['reset_confirm_ip', rate_limit_client_ip(), 30, 900],
]);
if (!isset($_SESSION['reset_user_id'])) {
http_response_code(400);
$answer['message'] = 'No active reset request. Please request a new OTP.';
exit(json_encode($answer));
app/login/api/login_helpers.php
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
<?php
/**
* login_helpers.php — shared pieces of the 2-step login flow
* (login_otp.php → login_confirm.php, with request_new_otp.php for resends).
*
* Pending-login session state (written by login_otp.php once the password has
* been verified; the password itself is never kept in the session):
* login_data['username'] — normalised username/email the user typed
* login_user_id — resolved user id
* password_verified_at — Unix time the password was checked
* otp_attempts — wrong OTP entries for the current code
* otp_resends — OTP resends for this pending login
*/
// One answer for unknown username, wrong password and locked account, so the
// login form cannot be used to find out which accounts exist.
const LOGIN_GENERIC_FAILURE = 'Incorrect username or password, or the account is temporarily locked.';
// A verified password is good for this long before the user must type it again.
const LOGIN_PENDING_SECONDS = 600;
// Wrong OTP entries allowed per issued code; the next one ends the pending login.
const LOGIN_OTP_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5;
// OTP resends allowed per pending login.
const LOGIN_OTP_MAX_RESENDS = 3;
/**
* 6-digit TOTP (HMAC-SHA1, 3-minute step) keyed by the user's password hash, so
* a password change invalidates it. Same algorithm db_auth.php re-derives on
* every request.
*/
function login_generate_otp(string $secret_key, int $otp_time, int $time_step = 180, int $length = 6): string {
$counter = floor($otp_time / $time_step);
$data = pack("NN", 0, $counter);
$hash = hash_hmac('sha1', $data, $secret_key, true);
$offset = ord(substr($hash, -1)) & 0x0F;
$value = unpack("N", substr($hash, $offset, 4));
$otp = ($value[1] & 0x7FFFFFFF) % pow(10, $length);
return str_pad(strval($otp), $length, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT);
}
/**
* Random 6-letter reference shown on the OTP screen and in the email. It used to
* be derived from the OTP, which let anyone who saw the reference recover the
* OTP offline by trying all 10^6 codes; a random value carries no information.
*/
function login_random_reference(): string {
$ref = '';
for ($i = 0; $i < 6; $i++) {
$ref .= chr(65 + random_int(0, 25));
}
return $ref;
}
/** Whether the session holds a pending login whose password check is still fresh. */
function login_pending_valid(): bool {
return !empty($_SESSION['login_user_id'])
&& !empty($_SESSION['password_verified_at'])
&& (time() - (int)$_SESSION['password_verified_at']) <= LOGIN_PENDING_SECONDS;
}
/** Answer with an HTTP status and a JSON message, then stop. */
function login_fail(int $status, string $message, array $extra = []): void {
http_response_code($status);
exit(json_encode(array_merge(['success' => 0, 'message' => $message], $extra)));
}
app/login/forgot_password.php
+8 -6
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,12 @@
$_SESSION['csrf_token'] = bin2hex(random_bytes(32));
}
require '../include_header.php';
require __DIR__ . '/include_login_header.php';
?>
<body>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/zxcvbn@4.4.2/dist/zxcvbn.js"></script>
<script src="<?php echo $server_url?>assets/vendor/zxcvbn/4.4.2/zxcvbn.js"></script>
<div class="container d-flex align-items-center justify-content-center min-vh-100">
<div class="card" style="max-width:420px; width:100%;">
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@
<div id="step_reset" class="d-none">
<div class="alert alert-info small py-2 mb-4">
<i class="ti ti-mail me-1"></i>
OTP sent to <strong id="masked_email"></strong>
— reference <strong id="ref_code"></strong>
<span id="request_message"></span>
Reference <strong id="ref_code"></strong>
</div>
<div class="mb-3">
<label class="form-label">OTP <span class="text-danger">*</span></label>
@@ -163,8 +163,10 @@
autoPrepare: false,
data: { json: JSON.stringify({ action: 'read', identifier: identifier }) },
onSuccess: function (r) {
$('#masked_email').text(r.masked_email);
$('#ref_code').text(r.reference);
// The server answers the same way whether or not the account exists,
// so there is no masked email to show — only its generic message.
$('#request_message').text(r.message || '');
$('#ref_code').text(r.reference || '');
$('#step_request').addClass('d-none');
$('#step_reset').removeClass('d-none');
$('#subtitle').text('Enter the OTP from your email and choose a new password.');
app/login/index.php
+18 -10
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
require '../session.php';
require '../config.php';
require_once '../assets/utils/otp_policy.php';
require '../include_header.php';
require __DIR__ . '/include_login_header.php';
// successful login — redirect based on app_access
if(!empty($_SESSION["login_status"])){
$redirect = ($_SESSION['login_app_access'] ?? 'wms') === 'accounting'
@@ -33,13 +33,9 @@
</div>
<form class="needs-validation mt-3" novalidate id="login-form">
<?php if (!otp_required()): ?>
<!-- OTP_REQUIRED is not true in config.php (the default): a password-only sign-in must never be invisible -->
<div class="alert alert-warning small py-2 mb-3" title="OTP_REQUIRED is not true in config.php">
<i class="ti ti-alert-triangle me-1"></i>
Email OTP is off — sign-in is password only.
</div>
<?php endif; ?>
<!-- Whether email OTP is on is server configuration and is not shown to
anonymous visitors; password-only sign-ins are logged as OTP_BYPASSED
(assets/utils/otp_policy.php). -->
<!-- first step login [OTP] -->
<?php if(!isset($_SESSION['login_data'])){?>
<div class="mb-3">
@@ -144,6 +140,16 @@
// The server ended the pending sign-in (too many wrong OTPs, or the verified
// password is too old): show why, then return to the username/password step.
function restart_login_on(xhr) {
if (xhr?.responseJSON?.code !== 'login_restart') return;
bootbox.hideAll();
bootbox.alert(escape_html(xhr.responseJSON.message || 'Please sign in again.'), function() {
window.location.href = "<?php echo $server_url?>login/index.php";
});
}
// reqquest new otp function
function request_new_otp() {
@@ -156,7 +162,8 @@
window.location.href = "<?php echo $server_url?>index.php";
}
},
onError: restart_login_on
});
}
@@ -194,7 +201,8 @@
window.location.href = "index.php";
}
},
onError: restart_login_on
});
}
app/setting/api/engine/request_reset_otp.php
+10 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,16 @@
<?php
// Profile page "Forgot your current password?" — signed-in users only.
// (This used to declare UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE, which let anonymous callers in
// with no $user_id; the login page has its own endpoint in login/api/engine/.)
require_once __DIR__ . '/../../../session.php';
define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/classes/PasswordResetManager.php';
// Every hit sends an email.
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['reset_req_user', (string)$user_id, 3, 900],
]);
$prm = new PasswordResetManager($pdo1, $pdo2, $include_url, $SMTP, $pinkey);
$prm->handleRequestOtp($user_id, $company_id);
$prm->handleRequestOtp($user_id, $company_id);
app/setting/api/engine/reset_password_otp.php
+7 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
<?php
// Profile page "Forgot your current password?" step 2 — signed-in users only.
require_once __DIR__ . '/../../../session.php';
define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/rate_limit.php';
require_once '../../../assets/utils/classes/PasswordResetManager.php';
rate_limit_guard($pdo1, [
['reset_confirm_user', (string)$user_id, 15, 900],
]);
$prm = new PasswordResetManager($pdo1, $pdo2, $include_url, $SMTP, $pinkey);
$prm->handleConfirmReset($user_id, $data);
$prm->handleConfirmReset($user_id, $data);