40 lines
1.3 KiB
PHP
40 lines
1.3 KiB
PHP
<?php
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/**
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* back.php — Logout endpoint
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*
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* Called by: login page AJAX "logout" / "go back" button.
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* Destroys the current session completely so the user is signed out.
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*
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* The 1-second sleep is intentional — it prevents a timing side-channel
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* that could let an attacker enumerate whether a valid session existed
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* by measuring response time.
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*
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* Flow:
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* 1. Load session.php to resume the active PHP session.
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* 2. Load db_auth.php to run standard auth/session bootstrap (required
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* by session.php dependency chain).
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* 3. Sleep 1 second (timing protection).
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* 4. Destroy the session entirely.
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* 5. Return { success: 1 }.
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*
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* Response JSON:
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* { "success": 1 }
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*/
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require_once '../../../session.php';
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define('UNAUTHENTICATED_ROUTE', true);
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require_once '../../../assets/utils/db_auth.php';
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// Clear session token so the account is free to log in elsewhere immediately
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if (!empty($_SESSION['login_user_id'])) {
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$pdo1->prepare("UPDATE user SET session_token = NULL, session_token_at = NULL WHERE user_id = :uid")
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->execute([':uid' => (int)$_SESSION['login_user_id']]);
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}
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// Intentional 1-second delay — prevents timing attacks on session enumeration
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sleep(1);
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session_destroy();
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$answer["success"] = 1;
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exit(json_encode($answer)); |